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The Rational Soul, with its Faculties, Intellect and Will, By Permission of the Illustrious Faculty of Philosophy

Ebble, Johann Leonhard Leipzig, 1670

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The Rational Soul,

With Its Faculties, Intellect and Will,

By Permission of

the Illustrious Faculty of Philosophy

at the University of Leipzig

Is Publicly Presented in a Pneumatic Disputation

Under the Presidency of

M. [[UNCLEAR: Jonas Eleonhard Poesner]], of Augsburg, Student of Sacred Theology

And with the Respondent

Johann Adam Wagner, of Schmalkalden, Student of Philosophy and Sacred Theology,

On the 25th day of June, in the Year of Our Restored Salvation 1670,

At the Customary Hours.

Leipzig, Printed by [[UNCLEAR: Johann Georg]].

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Under the Auspices of God, the Triune, Best and Greatest.

CHAPTER ONE

On the Rational Soul.

Since, as we please, it is thus permitted to us, setting aside the Soul in itself, we shall sketch it as RATIONAL with whatever brush we can; for not even Apelles himself could portray it in living colors. For indeed, although we philosophers are otherwise moles — either we are or we may be — when we stumble into the sunlight, that is, when we desire to contemplate the Rational Soul as an image of the Most Holy Trinity, we are rather seized by the excellence of the subject than able to seize it. Yet something must be dared; for what brings shame is not having failed to achieve your aim even after notable efforts, but having been unwilling to try at all. And more glory is won by the one who falls fighting nobly than by the one who withdraws in shameful flight.

Emboldened by this spirit, we approach the RATIONAL SOUL, which is as much more excellent than all other creatures after the familiar Ministers of the Creator as it is nearer to them, intending to set forth about it only as much as it itself, hindered in the prison of the body, has been able to reveal about itself.

Concerning its Origin, that is, whether it is created immediately by GOD, and once created, is infused into the prepared body of the embryo; or whether it is propagated by transmission — on this we remain silent here, intending to call this question into examination at another time, if it shall please GOD and the Illustrious Faculty of Philosophy. Wherefore, let it stand.

What the Rational Soul Is.

For to ask WHETHER IT EXISTS seems superfluous, since with our own eyes we observe daily that a living man carries out many operations which a dead man cannot perform. It follows that the body is not the cause of those operations, but that something else inheres in the body which produces them. Furthermore, since an operation is a transient action, that is, not...

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...firmly subsisting in itself, is necessary: a stable and constant originating principle of actions for the body, in whose presence life and every action is perfected, but upon whose departure life and actions alike perish. And this principle we call the human rational soul.

The definition given by Aristotle in Book 2 of *De Anima*, in the commentary text, although it pertains to the soul in itself, nevertheless applies generically to the rational soul, since it too is the first actuality of a natural body having life in potency. A clearer definition of the rational soul, however — namely, that it is the principle by which we live, sense, and understand — he presents in text 18.

So that you may understand that this definition is proper to the rational soul, apply salt — without which nothing is sweet — and take those words "by which we live, sense, and understand" not disjunctively. Otherwise they would apply to soul in general and would produce this meaning: the nature of the soul is so constituted that, as a form, it makes what is vegetative to be vegetative, what is sensitive to be sensitive, and what is intellective to be intellective — as Zabarella rightly notes in Book 2 of *De Anima*, Commentary on text 18, folio margin 66. Rather, take them copulatively.

And lest you perhaps fault the order in which we assigned the last place to the nobler faculty, I would have you know that we have followed the order of nature, which Aristotle followed at the cited passage according to Zabarella. Furthermore, since it is obscure — owing to the contrariety of opinions — what is to be understood by [[UNCLEAR: the actuality]] in the definition of soul as such, we have thought it necessary to explain this. On this point, note that a twofold actuality — namely first and second — is most commonly accepted among philosophers; yet what Aristotle understood by these is not agreed upon by all.

Averroes, whom some more recent philosophers support, held that both actualities are form, but with this distinction: that first actuality is form at rest, while form in operation is second actuality. He seems to have drawn his foundation from the Philosopher himself, who asserts in text 2 that form is actuality, divides actuality into two kinds, and consequently establishes both as form. Moreover, in text 5, which states, "For from the fact that the soul is present, both sleep and waking are present," Aristotle said that first actuality is similar to sleep, and second to waking. But in a sleeping animal there is still an operating form; from this, Averroes supposed that first actuality is non-operating form, and second actuality operating form.

Another argument of the defenders of Averroes is this: Since first actuality is posited in the definition of the soul, if it were operating form, it would follow

...it would follow that a non-operating form is not a form, and a non-operating soul would not be a soul. Therefore:

This argument is overturned when it is inverted in this way: If in the definition "first act" signifies form as non-operating, it follows that the soul, when it operates, is not a soul. For in the definition of a thing, that is stated which is inseparable from the thing itself; but to the soul that is actually operating, the definition of soul does not apply. Therefore the operating soul is not a soul — which is absurd; and even more absurd is what would follow: that an operating animal is not an animal.

We say therefore, with Zabarella, book 2, On the Soul, on text 6; Aristotle, book 2, On the Soul, folio 124; Arriaga, disputation 10, On the Soul, section 1, number 2, folio 424: The meaning of Aristotle is this — a natural body has two perfections. The first, by which it is constituted in its specific being and becomes a particular something, such as a human being; and this is the first perfection of the thing, which is the form informing and actualizing matter; thus it is called first act. However, because a thing so constituted but not operating does not have its full completeness, but retains something of imperfection, the added operation is therefore called second act and second perfection, which cannot exist without the first.

It is clear from this that an operating form is simultaneously first act and second act: insofar as it constitutes something — for example, a human being in its specific being — it is first act; insofar as it operates, it is second act.

8. These things can fittingly be attributed to the rational soul, because it is an act or perfection so much more excellent than the rest, inasmuch as it constitutes a species more excellent than all sublunary things — namely the human being — which is the first perfection or act; while the second consists in operations befitting such a species.

9. The rational soul is moreover called an act or perfection (for Aristotle in his definition uses the Greek word [[UNCLEAR: entelecheia]]) — because it is not an accident. For an accident can neither be the other part of a composite substance (such as a living body), nor the first principle of all actions, nor can it constitute the true difference between two substances. Nor is it a body, for two bodies cannot exist simultaneously in the same place. It is therefore an act or substantial form, through which an animated body truly is such — that is, through which it has the innate power of performing all the actions of life. And Sennert rightly says in Natural Science, [[UNCLEAR: book 4, On the Soul, chapter 1]].

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Section II. Whether the Rational Soul Is an Informing Form.

This question was once disputed, but today it is settled among philosophers, namely that the soul is the informing form of the human being. For it is necessary that every natural body have its own form, which by informing matter constitutes it in its species. But the human being is a natural body and a species of animal; therefore there must be in the human being some informing form that gives the human being its specific being within the genus of animal.

It was the opinion of Averroes (whom not a few followed) that the rational soul is merely an assisting form of the human being, not an informing one, and that it relates to the body no differently than a sailor relates to a ship. This can be read in his Commentary on Book 3 of *De Anima*, where he states: The term "act" is used of the rational soul and the other parts of the soul in an almost equivocal manner, since regarding the sensitive and vegetative soul it signifies an informing form, but regarding the rational soul an assisting form.

An assisting form (lest you think we are speaking in foreign terms) is one that is joined to a thing already possessing its specific being, in order to carry out certain nobler operations that the thing cannot perform by its own power. Such a form is the sailor in relation to the ship, who does not give the ship its specific being, but serves as the agent of navigation, which the ship cannot produce by itself. The same applies to the Intelligences that move the celestial spheres — though if they are moved by the first mover or by some other cause, something else must be said, which is not the subject of our inquiry. What an informing form is, is clear from section 10.

We attack the opinion of Averroes with a single but firm argument: If the rational soul is not the informing form of the human being, then a human being could in no way be called rational, just as a ship — even though a sailor reasons within it — cannot itself be called intelligent. But that a human being is properly and truly called rational is a matter of philosophical certainty. Therefore either the human being will not be rational, contrary to his intrinsic concept, or the rational soul will be an informing form. Add to this: that by which one thing differs in species from another is its form (this proposition is evident from the concept of form); but through the rational soul the human being differs from all other animals (this is clear from the definition of the human being); therefore the soul is the informing form of the human being — this follows necessarily.

Because the arguments with which Averroes strives to prove his opinion are not so slight that they can be dissolved by a breath, we shall touch upon the stronger of them briefly, and resolve them.

The first is: Knowledge of universals comes about by abstraction from matter, which befits only a faculty separated from matter. But the rational soul knows universals; therefore it is separated from matter; therefore it is not an informing form.

The second: The patient intellect is one and the same substance as the agent intellect; but the agent intellect, by the consensus of all, is a form separated from matter; therefore the patient intellect is also of this kind, and it is our rational soul.

The third he draws from the words of Aristotle, who in text 92 of Book 1 of *On the Soul* says: It cannot even be imagined which part of the body the intellect occupies; from which he deduces that the rational soul does not inform man.

The fourth, likewise from Aristotle, Book 4 of *On the Parts of Animals*, chapter 10: Happiness is divine, and the best of the divine is to be wise and to understand. [[UNCLEAR: Thus]] he argues: Aristotle would not call man divine unless the human mind were a divine form, separated from matter, and therefore merely an assisting form. For more, if you wish, see Zabarella, Book 2, *On the Soul*, chapter 5, section 186 ff. Briefly [[UNCLEAR: consider this]]: Only man is upright in spirit because his nature and [[UNCLEAR: substance is divine]].

To the first, I respond: The knowledge of universals in the intellect requires a certain abstraction, not according to being but according to operation. And by this reasoning the intellect is said to be abstracted from matter insofar as it is separated from matter in its operation. Apply the same distinction to argument 2, and you will gather that nothing else follows from either of them than that the intellect is not organic, which we shall assert below.

To the [[UNCLEAR: third]], I respond: Aristotle in the cited passage meant nothing other than that the intellect is not organic, from which it does not follow that it does not give being to man. For Aristotle would have spoken absurdly (which far be it to say of so great a Philosopher), since an informing form occupies the whole body, if he had asked which part of the body it informs. The fitting question therefore is: which part does it occupy in operating? That is, which organ does it use? Therefore, says Aristotle, no part of the body serves as an organ for it.

To the fourth, I respond: This has no force. For Aristotle did not [[UNCLEAR: ...page ends mid-sentence]]

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the nature and substance of man; but he calls every form divine and most excellent, book 2, On the Generation of Animals, chapter 3, because being and living are participated from God. Furthermore, he is accustomed to call certain things divine by comparison with baser things; as in Physics, book 1, he calls form divine in relation to matter, by which it is desired. And in book 2, chapter 2, On the Generation of Animals, he calls every faculty of the soul divine in relation to the elements and things devoid of soul. See Zabarella, book 2, On the Soul, chapter 9, pages 213-214.

Section II. Whether the Rational Soul Is One in All Human Beings.

From the preceding question this one arises: for those who consider it to be an assisting form assert that it is not multiplied according to the number of human beings, but that in the entire human species there is a single one, which is the cause of intellection for all people — [[UNCLEAR: namely]] the Averroists. We, in agreement with the common opinion and consistently with what was said above, say that in each individual there is a particular rational soul; since every informing form is multiplied according to the multiplication of individuals, the matter is self-evident (for I do not recall having read or heard of any philosopher who today holds the contrary view), and therefore it requires no further effort. See Sennert, Natural Science, book 8, chapter 1, On the Rational Soul, folio margin 65.

It lacks essential parts, that is, subject and form; because, as has been sufficiently proven, it is precisely a form — not something composed of a subject and another form, but an incomplete being. Otherwise, it could not constitute a unity in itself together with the body; for from a complete being, as from a part, a whole in itself cannot be constituted. Therefore it is not composed of essential parts. This opinion is the common one, and therefore one should not depart from it, lest while we wish to appear uniquely wise, we seem foolish.

Section IV. Whether the Rational Soul Is Immortal.

This is one of the weightiest questions in all of Christian Philosophy, because the immortality of the soul is the sole and firm foundation of civil life. If it is denied, neither the Christian Religion nor any Republic can endure; indeed, all human society must necessarily perish. The ancient philosophers treated this question and endorsed immortality. Plato, according to the Coimbra commentators, On the Separated Soul, disputation 1, question 1, steadfastly

[[UNCLEAR: constantly]] treated; concerning the mind of Aristotle, the matter is not sufficiently established; some think that he held the negative view. This much is certain: that in this matter he was undecided, and concealed his opinion behind the obscurity of his words.

25. Epicurus alone was (absurdly eloquent, more absurdly prolific — for as many as he persuaded, so many monstrosities he begot, unless you prefer to call them his legitimate offspring) the one who surrendered his body to pleasures, as a pig to mud, and immersed in them (submerged, rather) left behind the wicked opinion that the rational soul perishes with the body; when he bequeathed to his followers, as a testament, the Canon of the pleasure-seekers, by no means canonical: Eat, drink, play; after death there is no pleasure. He perished as he lived. And would that the impious opinion had perished with its impious author.

26. Before we set forth what we think, it should be known that there is a twofold kind of immortality. The first is that which can in no way perish, because it is most simple, has its being from itself, and depends on nothing. Such is GOD alone, and in comparison with Him all other things may be called mortal and corruptible. The second is that which is never actually destroyed, because it has no contrary and is independent of a subject, like an Angel. Yet because they are not independent of a cause — for they do not exist of themselves but from another — by that other they can by nature cease to exist. For everything that depends on something, if that on which it depends is a voluntary principle, can be changed, and by the will of the first principle be deposed from the essence in which it was established by that principle. Yet certain things are not actually destroyed, because the Creator does not will it — He who created in them nothing contrary by which they might be destroyed, nor did He so immerse them in matter that they could neither subsist nor operate apart from it. And such is the rational soul.

27. We say therefore: the rational soul is immortal in the second sense. This the Orthodox faith confirms from Matthew 25, where the most gentle Savior proclaims that life for His faithful and punishment for the wicked shall endure eternally. It is not necessary to adduce more.

28. As for what the Epicureans object from the contrary position, citing Ecclesiastes chapter 3, verse 19 — The fate of the sons of men is the fate of beasts; it is the same for them; as one dies, so dies the other, and man has no advantage over the beast — this is easily resolved if death or destruction is understood to refer to the composite being, not to the soul. For the composite of a man perishes equally as that of a horse. As for the passage, Since we are born by mere chance, and after this we shall be as though we had never been, etc., the response is that verse 1 sufficiently demonstrates this to be the voice of the impious. Therefore this authority is too weak to prove the mortality of the soul.

29.

The argument of Sennert: Every form, of whatever kind it may be, reveals itself through its own operations. Wherefore, since human actions are so noble that they cannot belong to a mortal substance wholly immersed in matter, it is not obscurely gathered that the rational soul, from which they proceed, is immaterial and separable from matter. What, moreover, the human actions are, is known to everyone. This argument, I say, since it is only a posteriori, persuades only probably.

30.

The arguments of the Coimbrans, cited by Arriaga in Disputation 1 on the Separated Soul, Section 1, Subsection 2, number 7 and following, accomplish the same thing. The first is from the analogy of the Angel, whom they say is immortal because it is a substance subsisting by itself; for the difficulty is the same in both cases. Second, from the spirituality of the soul, which is proved from the cognition of a spiritual object, from which is proved its independence from matter, and consequently its immortality. Finally, from the righteous governance of God, the most just Judge (this is more evangelical than philosophical), by which He has decreed eternal punishment for the impious and an eternally happy life for the pious. For it is unbecoming of God, they say, to leave without any reward those who, for example, offered themselves to torments and ignominious death for the defense of religion, or for His honor and glory, or for some virtue (which today the Jesuits boast of doing in the Indies, Japan, England, and other parts of the world, although it will finally become known to the whole world that they have produced crimes following upon tortures and death); and on the other hand, to allow their killers, tyrants, adulterers, murderers, and the like, to go unpunished and glorying in their crimes. Therefore, it must be said that after this life there is a place of glory and of punishment, and accordingly that the soul endures outside the body and is immortal.

31.

We confess, in a word, that since the rational soul is immortal in the second way, its immortality cannot be proved a priori, or in a properly philosophical manner. Therefore, faith must suffice for us.

Section V. Whether the Rational Soul Is Unmixed, and Whether Its Operation Is Organic

This arises from Aristotle, who in Book 1 of *On the Soul* said that it is something unmixed. Note, however, that the rational soul must be unmixed in two ways. First, from its objects, so that it does not have their nature in its own essence, but only the power of receiving them; for since objects, [[UNCLEAR: cogni-]] (text continues on next page)

it must know; and since it knows by receiving things, it is necessary that it be free from them and unmixed with them, for nothing receives what it already has. And this unmixedness is common to the rational soul together with the senses, as will be clear to anyone who considers the matter. In another way, and in a quite particular manner, the rational soul is free from a bodily organ and not mixed with one (as the external senses are); that is, when it operates by understanding or by willing, it does not use the body, but carries out its functions without it. For actions that take place in the body and through it require a certain temperament (since not just any body, tempered in any manner whatsoever, can receive just any thing), and the different parts of the body have different temperaments. But since the rational soul is not bound to any particular temperament of qualities, and no organ proper to it can be found, we hold that it is entirely independent of the body and unmixed with it, by reason of its operations.

From this determination it follows that the operations of the rational soul are not organic; recall what was said in the preceding section. And although, while existing in the body, it makes use of the phantasm, it nevertheless uses it not as an organ but as an object.

But if you contend that the operations of the rational soul depend on the service of the brain, the senses, and the spirits as organs, we admit this only in the following sense: that the soul, while it is in the body, does not understand without a preceding operation of the bodily organs and before its own operation; that is, in subordinate operations it uses an organ and requires the brain and spirits. But when it understands purely by itself, or purely wills, it does not at all require them; rather, the soul itself is the subject of intellection and volition.

From this you will understand that when the brain is injured and reasoning is impaired, this happens because the subordinate faculties, which are organic and depend on the constitution of the brain, are damaged. See Sennert, book 8, Natural Science, chapter 1, On the Rational Soul, folio margin 655.

CHAPTER TWO On the Faculties of the Rational Soul

Enough has been said so far about the rational soul considered in itself; in our customary manner, we shall briefly present its faculties, and whatever is worthy of knowledge and necessary concerning them shall be set forth.

Section 1.

On the Faculties in General

We are not unaware that it was formerly, and still is today, the most common opinion among philosophers that the Rational Soul possesses the power of growth and sensation; and we subscribe to this view.

Beyond these faculties, however, it is commonly acknowledged that it possesses others by which it surpasses both plants and brute animals, since its operations, which are shared neither with brute animals nor with plants but are far more excellent, reveal them. I therefore say:

The principal faculty of the Rational Soul is the intellect; the second is the will; by which, insofar as is permitted to mortals, we are made like God. Some add memory as a third; yet most deny that it is distinct from the intellect. The intellect, moreover, is that faculty by which we apprehend and know things. The will, on the other hand, is that by which we are drawn toward those things we have known under the aspect of good, with freedom to choose the opposite, according to that well-known saying:

I see the better and approve it, but I follow the worse.

Furthermore, the distinction between these faculties is clear, since knowing is one thing and desiring what is known is another. The former occurs by being acted upon, that is, by receiving forms, so that things are brought to the mind; the latter by pursuing, so that the mind is drawn toward the object. Finally, the diversity of the object gives rise to a diversity of powers, since we know things as beings but desire them as goods. However, since the question of the distinction of the soul from its faculties, and of these faculties from one another, is too celebrated among philosophers to be resolved in so few words, there will be:

Section II.

Whether the faculties are distinct from the soul.

Note that the expression "to differ really" can be taken in two ways. First, for that which is to differ in subject, as when, with Aristotle, we say that matter and privation are not distinct in reality, that is, in subject, just as an apple and the whiteness in the apple are not really distinct but only in reason. Second, it is taken for differing according to a distinct essence; thus we say that matter and privation, an apple and whiteness, are really distinct, that is, they have diverse essences. The present question is understood according to the second meaning.

has its place. Hence the question arises: since they exist in the same subject, whether they are distinguished from the essence of the soul.

Thomas, in the First Part, question 77, article 1, and in the Sentences, distinction 3, question 4, article 2, and his followers, along with Aegidius, Cajetan, and many others cited in Arriaga, Disputation 3 On the Soul, Section 1, subsection 3, number 88, hold the opinion that the faculties of the rational soul are accidents, and therefore are really distinguished from it.

The first argument is this: No substance is immediately operative; therefore it requires powers that are really distinct from it.

Second: An operation and its principle must be in the same genus or order; but the rational soul is a substance; therefore it cannot be the immediate principle of its own actions.

Third: Other substances operate by means of distinct accidents, as is evident in the four elements operating through the four primary qualities; likewise in heavy and light bodies moving themselves through distinct gravity and lightness; therefore, so too does the rational soul.

Fourth: If the will and the intellect were really the same as the soul, the intellect would love and the will would understand, which is absurd; therefore they must be distinguished from the soul. These are the chief arguments by which the Thomists and other defenders of this position protect themselves.

In response to the first: the assumption is false, even by his own assertions, in which he grants that an accident can immediately produce a substance, and likewise that the power of local motion can produce location. Why then could a substance not do this immediately?

To the second: I deny that an operation and its principle must be in the same order; indeed, I assert that they cannot always be so. This is evident because a phantasm immediately and partially produces spiritual species. If, therefore, a thing of a lower order can contribute to producing a thing of a higher order, why could the reverse not also be possible? For the nature of a principle for producing an effect requires only that it contain that effect either formally or eminently.

To the third: I respond that the soul concurs immediately in its own operations, and therefore it does not need a distinct separate power. As for the examples of heavy and light bodies, I say that gravity and lightness are nothing other than the heavy or light body itself; and therefore a body is not carried upward by a distinct lightness nor downward by a distinct gravity, but intrinsically by its very own nature.

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To the fourth, the logical objection: I want you to recall that this formal sense is as follows — insofar as the same soul regards two acts, one of the intellect and the other of the will, it obtains two names that are formally non-interchangeable. From this, no absurdity follows. These arguments will be further obscured when the grandeur of what follows appears in support of the natural position.

Section III.

The Position of Scotus and Our Own.

17.

The Subtle Scotus, in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 1, as he was always opposed to Thomas, so also here he dissented from him. Gregory of Rimini followed him, in the above-cited question 3. Indeed, the entire School of Scotus holds that the powers of the soul are the very substance of the soul itself, called by various names on account of its various operations. We subscribe to this view.

This position is proved in Arriaga, disputation 3 on the Soul, section 5, subsection 4, number 119, by the authority of the Fathers. And first, by the great Aurelius Augustine, who in *On the Spirit and the Soul*, chapters 4 and 6, says: "The soul, which is called by various names according to the office of its operation, is called soul insofar as it gives life; spirit insofar as it contemplates; sense insofar as it perceives; mind insofar as it knows wisely. Yet these do not differ in substance as they do in names, because that soul is one soul." Isidore and Bernard subscribe to Augustine. The former, in book 11 of the *Etymologies*, says in these words: "When the soul gives life to the body, it is soul; when it wills, it is will; when it understands, it is mind; when it remembers, it is memory; when it perceives something, it is sense." The latter, in sermon 11 on the *Song of Songs*, says: "In the soul I perceive three things: reason, memory, and will, and these three are the same soul." We venerate this authority; however, since these testimonies are more fitting for a preacher than for a philosopher, we, who are here acting as philosophers, will bring forward other arguments.

19.

The first argument is from Scotus and his School: That of which the definition is predicated, of the same thing the name of the defined is also predicated. But the definition of active power is predicated of form; therefore, so is the name. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved by the authority of Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 9, who defines active power as follows: "Active power is the principle of changing another, insofar as it is other." But form (the rational soul) is such a principle; therefore the conclusion follows.

The second argument. As passive power relates to the patient, so active power relates to the agent (for the account of contraries is the same).

...tion) understand "there" as referring to matter and "here" to form. But the passive potency of matter is matter itself; therefore the active potency will be form itself. Furthermore, if the potency of matter were something different from matter, it would be an accident and would be received in matter before the substantial form, which is absurd.

Third [19]: Just as merely natural forms (that is, inanimate ones), such as fire and so forth, relate to their operations, so also does the soul relate to its own. But those forms are the immediate principle of their actions without any mediating power; therefore so too is the rational soul. The likeness is manifest, for no one, I think, will assert that the rational soul, the noblest of all forms, is of lesser perfection than an inanimate form, which can pass into second act without any mediating power. This is true both of substantial and of accidental form: for the former is nature, that is, an immediate principle of motion, which the word "first" signifies. The same holds equally of accidental form; for the heat of fire immediately heats other things without a mediating power. The same is true of heaviness and lightness, as was already said above. Therefore the soul immediately understands without a distinct intellect, immediately wills, and so forth. Therefore the powers are not really distinct from the soul.

Fourth [20]. An agent never acts on the extreme without first acting on the medium, if a medium is present. Therefore the soul would first act on the intellect before it understands. The same applies to the will, which is absurd.

Fifth [21]. If the powers are different from the essence of the soul, then they depend on it as on a cause. But no kind of causality can be assigned: for they do not depend on it as on a material cause, nor as on a final cause, nor as on a formal cause, as is clear. Therefore they depend on it as on an efficient cause. Therefore the soul immediately produces something, which the adversaries deny. But if it produces those powers by means of other powers, there will be an infinite regress, which is unworthy of a philosopher.

I add one more point [22] before I draw the final conclusion, one which overturns the primary foundation of the contrary opinion and confirms our own.

Those distinct powers are either substances or accidents, and they operate either immediately or mediately. Not the first, because in that case a substance would be immediately produced by a substance, which is against the adversaries. If they are accidents, the same conclusion follows that the adversaries deny: namely, that a substance is immediately operative. If, however, these powers also

...are produced by means of others, there will be an infinite regress. If indeed those distinct powers operate immediately, it is absurd to grant to accidents what is denied to substance. If they operate by means of others, the same question will return about these, and so on without end. From all of which, the assertion of the Most Magnificent and Most Excellent Lord Doctor Scherzer indeed stands firm: that the soul operates through itself. And we evidently conclude not that the faculties of the soul do not exist, but that they are indistinct from the soul.

Let the argument of Arriaga close the ranks — though without necessity — which he brings forward for this opinion in Disputation 3, On the Soul, section 5, subsection 4, number 129. It is this: Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity; therefore, the powers of the soul are not to be distinguished from it. For nature does not accomplish through more means what it can accomplish through fewer. But the soul is by itself and immediately sufficient for understanding and willing; therefore, it does not need distinct powers. We praise Nature when, while a stepmother to others, she is a patron to us. Whoever wants more may consult Zabarella, On the Soul, book 2, chapter 2, folio margin 371 and following.

Section IV.

How are the faculties of the soul distinguished from one another?

The question is set forth in the present section, namely how the intellect is distinguished from the will — a question easily answered if what was said in the preceding section is well understood.

We say, therefore, that they are formally distinguished from one another. This distinction does not come simply from the diversity of acts, since apprehension and judgment, assent and dissent, proceed from the same power, although they are distinguished from each other in kind in the [[UNCLEAR: most distinct]] manner.

Rather, the distinction comes from the formal object and the diverse manner of tending toward it: namely, the object of the intellect is the intelligible, while that of the will is the lovable; the former tends toward its object necessarily, the latter freely. The matter becomes clear through the divine attributes, for example, Justice and Mercy, which differ formally according to their formal object and manner of tending. For Justice has as its object the punishable, toward which it tends with rigor; Mercy has as its object the pitiable, toward which it tends with clemency.

As for the questions whether the same power can produce acts diverse in species, and whether diverse powers can produce acts diverse only in number — since they seem neither necessary nor useful, we omit them. Rather, we proceed to CHAPTER

CHAPTER THREE

On the Faculties of the Rational Soul in Particular

Enough has been said, I think, about the faculties in general; hence without detours let us proceed to them in particular, and indeed in

Section I.

On the Intellect and Its Acts

Note before all else that a twofold intellect is most commonly assigned: namely the Agent, which produces intelligible species, and the Passive, which receives those species and understands them. Yet these are not two distinct intellects, but only its different functions.

The object of the intellect is the intelligible: both being and non-being. For we dispute about everything, which we could not do if we did not apprehend it, etc.

You will perhaps say: Non-being does not have a species, therefore it cannot be an object of the intellect; for whatever is known must be in the intellect through species.

I respond: non-being does have a species, not indeed a formal one, but an interpretive one, or as the great and excellent Dr. Scherzerus well puts it, an occasional one; namely when the intellect argues: here I do not find being, therefore it is non-being. In the Brief Eustachius, question 222, folio 474.

Arriaga amasses many arguments in Disputation 6 on the Soul, Section 2 and following, for the weighty question of in what the formal nature of intellection consists, or how the rational soul understands. Indeed I do not see so great a difficulty, once the doctrine concerning the twofold function of the intellect is well understood. Therefore:

I say briefly that intellection consists in action and passion, in which life is imbued; namely when the Agent Intellect produces intelligible species, and the Passive Intellect receives them. Moreover, intelligible species are nothing other than illuminated phantasms, which the agent intellect purges of material conditions. Whether indeed intelligible species are purely spiritual accidents, as Sennertus maintains in Natural Philosophy, Book 8, Chapter 1, On the Rational Soul, or material ones — because this has not been sufficiently proven, I leave it undecided, and since time does not permit, I reserve it for further speculation.

10.

We also say that the intellect knows singular things, since for example it knows this sensible horse. And although the intellect is of universals and sense is of singulars, this should be understood only cumulatively, that is, the intellect is of both universals and singulars; sense is privatively, that is, of singulars only.

Whether the same act of the intellect can reflect upon itself

This is as ingenious as it is curious a question, known only to the more recent scholastics (as far as I know at least). Many deny it: Because cognition is a relation to an object, but a relation must be distinct from its terminus; therefore cognition must also be distinct from its object. Likewise, the object must be prior to the cognition, and therefore distinct from it. For the existence or possibility of the object is independent of cognition, but cognition depends on the object; for the object does not exist because it is known, but the contrary. Furthermore, the object is the cause of cognition, either through itself or through a species; but nothing can be the cause of itself. Therefore.

To the first, I deny the antecedent universally: for it is essential to cognition as such only to express its object; but when it has expressed itself, this happens without a relation, and when it expresses something other than itself, with a relation. This is confirmed by divine cognition, which knows itself and yet does not have a relation to itself. To the second: I bring forward an instance in the cognition of God, which is not posterior to itself and yet is the object of itself. To the proof, I say that in some objects and cognitions this is true, but not in all; which is apparent from God's cognition of himself and of possible creatures; for the possibility of the creature is not prior to divine cognition, nor the contrary, since they essentially depend on each other on account of their mutual transcendental relation. To the third, I deny the antecedent, because when an effect is known in its cause, the cognition of it is not caused by the known effect, but by the cause in which it is known.

Therefore I agree with Arriaga, and I say that cognition can be reflexive upon itself. In theological speculations the matter is beyond doubt: for an Angel can by divine power comprehend itself and all its acts; therefore necessarily also that act by which it comprehends all, otherwise it would not comprehend all. But

But the greater difficulty concerns human acts. It is nevertheless proven. When I say as a matter of fact that it belongs to the concept of omnipotence to be able to produce all creatures without exception, this act has itself as its object, for it is itself one among all of them. The same occurs when I say that every act of the intellect is a cognition — therefore also that very act by which I say this.

Section III Whether assent and dissent regarding the same object are mutually incompatible.

That is: whether the intellect cannot simultaneously judge that Peter is running and that Peter is not running. There were some, says Arriaga (Disputation 8, On the Soul, section 5, no. 84), though he does not endorse those who held that this could happen, on the grounds that these two acts could simultaneously be placed in a stone supernaturally — and therefore also in the intellect naturally.

The contrary opinion, because it is truer, is therefore more common. It is proven by the admission of the adversaries themselves, who grant that the intellect cannot dissent from an object that is evidently proposed to it as true, since it is a necessary faculty, nor can the will efficaciously will what it recognizes as absolutely impossible. It evidently follows that while it evidently knows Peter to be running, or so judges, it cannot give assent to the contradictory proposition. The same holds for hatred and love regarding the same object and in the same respect. Regarding the same object but in different respects, love and hatred can coexist. The same applies to the intellect with regard to assent and dissent.

To the argument of the adversaries, I say that we are speaking of a capable subject; but a stone is an incapable subject, as will be evident to anyone who considers it. Therefore it proves nothing.

But you will say: the intellect can simultaneously judge both sides of a contradiction to be probable. Therefore it will also be able to assent to both.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent. It can judge it to be probable — that is, that both simultaneously exist — this I deny. It can judge it to be probable — that is, that each side has some reasons in its favor, though not compelling ones — this I concede. And in this there is no contradiction, since it neither assents to what is false nor dissents from what is true.

The three operations of the mind, because they are known to all and contain no special difficulties, we omit. But what it means for something to be understood quiddi[[UNCLEAR: tatively — text continues on next page]]

to comprehend quiddatively, intuitively, and abstractively; since regarding the manner of speaking we leave to each their own [[UNCLEAR: opinion]], until we become better acquainted with the matter, we pass over things disputable by the intellect; [[UNCLEAR: for we would believe]] to know and comprehend [[UNCLEAR: it is carried, and different people understand differently]]. We have not established anything certain from the schools.

We pass over other less necessary matters about fire, lest we cause tedium to the Kind Reader.

CHAPTER FOUR On the Will and Its Acts

That we may also treat of this briefly, the will is the other power of the rational soul, by which we follow or turn away from what is known by the intellect. It is also called appetite; for just as the sensitive appetite follows the cognition of the senses, so the mind's own appetite follows its cognition; and to distinguish it from the other [[UNCLEAR: by distinguishing marks]], it is called the will.

[[UNCLEAR: truly among themselves, it consists of continuous points]]

Section 1 On the Object of the Will

Before we treat of the object, I would like to note that there are two acts in the will: one of Love or pursuit, the other of flight or hatred. The first is directed toward the good; the second toward evil.

The object of the will is therefore the good as known by the intellect, and conversely, evil. The former it loves, desires, and pursues; the latter it hates, flees, and turns away from. Now good is threefold: the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. The first is that which is good in itself, without regard to anything else, such as God and Virtue. The second is that which produces good, such as riches. The pleasurable is that which is good in itself and brings pleasure to another, such as beauty, etc. And these two latter pertain to concupiscence, while the former pertains to benevolence; though they do not necessarily include one another. This only in passing, for a fuller understanding of what follows.

From this arises the question: whether the will can love what is formally evil as such, and hate what is formally good as such.

To decide this question, I suppose that a threefold evil is opposed to the threefold good enumerated above: either in itself, or formally to another, or causally. Evil in itself is the formal lack of good, such as the lack of light, etc. Evil to another is that which is unsuitable for another; as extreme heat is bad for another because it harms. To the useful good is opposed evil

impeding the execution of the end. Likewise note: that which is evil in itself can take on the character of good with respect to another. For example, death, which is a privation of life, is evil in itself, yet it can be good with respect to another, insofar as through it one is snatched away from evils, or for another reason, as below. And that which is evil to someone in one kind can be good for the same person in another kind, as is evident in the burning of a cautery or in medicine. With these points established:

We say first. Evil under the aspect of evil to another can not only be loved but is in fact loved. If for no other reason, I would wish this assertion to be false, and would willingly enter, as they commonly say, the sack, if its truth could be overcome. But too much stands in its favor: the impious wishes of wicked children toward their parents, and of perverse spouses toward one another, by which they curse upon them all dreadful things and death itself, because they think it good for themselves if those whom they wish removed are taken from their midst, so that they may enjoy either greater freedom or an inheritance. I pass over other examples.

We say second. The will can love evil for itself, as such, provided it finds in it a good for another who is loved. And this is true, but rarer than the first case. It pertains to the love of friendship, as when someone, solely out of regard for this, desires for themselves pains, or punishments, indeed even death itself, on behalf of a dear friend.

We say third. Evil under the aspect of evil, both for oneself and for another, cannot be loved. Experience proves our conclusion, since we can love nothing unless we apprehend some goodness, however small, in the object, whether that goodness be feigned or real. The a priori reason is that every inclination is always toward the good, but from evil as such there is flight and aversion.

We say fourth. The indifferent, as such — that is, so proposed by the intellect that although it may be good or evil in itself, it is nevertheless not represented as such — cannot be loved, because no goodness is proposed in it that would incline the will; nor can it be hated, because no evil is proposed that would deter.

But if perhaps you object that one who inflicts death upon himself out of despair loves evil for himself under the aspect of evil, I respond: such a person apprehends death as good, either because he is freed through it from great miseries, or because he believes it will be troublesome to another whom he hates, which sometimes occurs in insane love.

Or: that someone can love [[UNCLEAR: for himself]] evil in order to exercise his freedom.

12.

evil, as evil, and to hate the good, as good. Response 1: Simply put, this cannot be accomplished by the will, since it can exercise its freedom only concerning its proper object. But evil is not the proper object of love, nor is good the proper object of hatred. 2. Even if the will could do this, it would nevertheless then apprehend some aspect of goodness, at least an extrinsic one, namely that it serves as the goal of exercising freedom, and on account of that goodness it would be moved to exercise these acts.

Concerning simple affection or complacency in the good, and other acts of the will, see the various authors throughout.

13.

Whether the will can love one of two equal goods over the other, or love a lesser good.

The question is extremely difficult because our freedom depends on it. The state of the question is this: When two goods are presented, either equal or unequal, yet in such a way that equal goods are proposed with equal clarity, can the will choose one over the other, or from two unequal goods choose the lesser?

Vasquez (book 1, part 2, disputation 43, chapter 20, cited in Arriaga, disputation 2 on the Soul, section 5, subsection 1) holds that the will cannot love a lesser good unless it is proposed with greater intensity; indeed, that it cannot even choose one of two equal goods over the other. He proves the first point as follows: a lesser good, as such, is formally evil, just as conversely a lesser evil, as such, insofar as it deprives one of a greater evil, is good. But evil as evil cannot be loved. Therefore, neither can a lesser good. This argument has no force, because it involves an equivocation. For we are not speaking of a lesser good insofar as it is lesser, but of a lesser good insofar as it is good; and in this respect it can be loved.

That the will cannot love one equal good over another, he proves as follows: When it chooses this rather than that, it is more attracted by this than by that. But it cannot be more attracted by one than by the other, given that the goods are equal. Therefore, and so on. Nor does this argument present any difficulty. For the fact that the will is actually attracted to this particular good depends on its own freedom, which is able to refrain from loving any other good whatsoever. From this it follows that the will can refuse to let itself be attracted by a greater good, and likewise by a lesser or equal good. Suppose a man has before him two

apples a and b, either entirely equal among themselves, or unequal c; I see no reason why it could not choose from the equal ones apple b, for example, over a, or even the unequal one c, solely because it wills it.

From which our opinion sufficiently stands without further proof. If, however, one wishes, see Arriaga, cited work, subsection 2.

That the will depends on cognition, so that we can naturally will nothing unless we first know it, the philosophical maxim (though not properly grammatical) "Nothing is willed unless first known" sufficiently proves.

Since, however, the freedom of the will cannot be fully explained except together with those things which seem to impede it, and those things cannot be brought forward within the narrow confines of these pages, we refrain from discussing it further.

Moreover, that the will has command over the sensitive appetite and the locomotive faculty needs no arguments, since it is known to all that we move and rest at the will's commands. That command, however, has been weakened through sin, and the harmony between both appetites has been disturbed, so that very often the sensitive appetite throws off the command of the will and of right reason, and that saying is true:

The charioteer is carried away by the horses, nor does the chariot heed the reins.

Over the vegetative faculty it has plainly no command, but must leave it to the course of nature.

CHAPTER FIVE On the Separated Soul

After we have briefly discussed some things about the rational soul as enclosed in the body, a few things remain to be said about it as separated from the body: not because we would offer these as undoubted truths, since not even one person has yet been found who has demonstrated the truth either by experience or by reason (we place no faith in the apparitions of papists, which are rather dreams or at most illusions), but because what has been suitably said up to now, though conjecturally, as it is stated by others, may also be stated by us.

Sole Section

Three things chiefly present themselves for explanation: 1. Whether the soul can be preserved outside the body and is immortal; but since this has already been treated in Chapter 5, Section 4, in its entirety, therefore only the following two remain: 2, namely whether that state is connatural to the soul, and 3, what it can do in that state.

[15]

[16]

[18]

[I]

Regarding the former of these, note: That it is connatural in the first sense, namely natural or non-miraculous, in which sense it is certain from what has been said about the soul in the cited passage that the separated state of the soul is connatural. In another sense, meaning non-violent, in which sense something natural can fail to be connatural — as heat in relation to water, or the upward motion of a heavy body, which are naturally produced in them yet contrary to their natural tendency. With these preliminaries noted:

We say that the separation of the soul, physically speaking, is not natural to it, but violent, or as the Great and Excellent Dr. Scherzerus well puts it in the Brief Eustadius, question 233, preternatural. The reason is this: because considered physically, the soul is substantially incomplete and imperfect. Therefore it desires perfection and completion, which all things do by innate appetite. Something different would have to be said if the physical consideration were set aside.

It remains to consider what the soul can accomplish in the state of separation. In our view, there is no difficulty in holding that the soul retains with it the material powers — improperly and inadequately, however — and the spiritual powers, because we do not distinguish them really from the essence of the soul. I said material powers improperly or inadequately because we do not grant that it has material powers properly and adequately, for example the power of sight, hearing, and so forth. For it lacks the organs necessary for those acts, even though it possesses the effective principle of them, or rather is itself that principle. The comparison with a blind person will illustrate the matter; consider it briefly and it will become clear. The intellect, however, and the will, which do not depend on organs in their operations, the soul retains with it. Hence:

It must be said that the separated soul cannot hear, see, smell, and so forth, due to the lack of organs. But it can understand and will, since it possesses the requisites for these. For it carries away and retains intelligible species, since it remembers its past life. It also acquires new ones, because it understands new things. How this happens — since there is no doubt that it happens more perfectly — I shall say when I have come to know it.

That the separated soul can change its location (to move in the proper sense belongs to bodies) is doubted by few; we admit that it can, because it is not bound to this imaginary location rather than another. See the Brief Eustadius, question 242. That it is not in a place circumscriptively, but definitively, the nature of the soul demonstrates.

On Immortality

We pray: May God, thrice greatest and best, grant that we, after casting off the bulk of our bodies, may know Him better in Himself, and contemplate Him happily for eternity.

THE END